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In a recent investigation, Schenk (2012a) reexamined DF's intact grasping behavior. On the basis of his findings, Schenk proposed that DF's dorsal-stream vision does not rely on visual size information [as Goodale et al. (1991) originally suggested it did] and instead relies on egocentric cues that specify the spatial relationship between the hand and the visible edges of a target object. According to Schenk, these egocentric cues are only utilized when haptic information about the object is available and spatially coincident with the viewed object. In other words, he argues that the core difference between standard grasping tasks and perceptual estimates of object size is the multisensory nature of the former. In short, he suggests that DF's spared visuomotor abilities are the products of "multimodal integration." Here, we highlight some potentially problematic assumptions that underlie Schenk's view, before considering some alternative interpretations of Schenk's data. We then suggest an experimental design that might help determine which explanation best accounts for DF's data.
In the first of Schenk's (2012a) tasks, DF viewed pairs of cylinders that were drawn from a set of three. The three cylinders varied in diameter only, and, therefore, varied in overall size. DF was asked to point to the larger object of the pair. On this task (Task 1), DF showed some sensitivity to the size differences, but only when the smallest cylinder was paired with the largest one. However, when the cylinders were presented alone and DF was asked to approximate their size using her thumb and forefinger (a perceptual "manual estimate"), her estimates bore no systematic relationship to the sizes of the objects (Task 2). Schenk then used a mirror apparatus to test DF in a series of grasping tasks. The mirror allowed a cylinder to be placed behind it, hidden from view, such that the position of this hidden cylinder could match the apparent position of the cylinder viewed in the mirror (Task 3 and Task 5 "standard grasp" trials). In some conditions, however, no cylinder was presented behind the mirror (Task 4 and Task 5 "no haptic feedback" trials). In another condition, the position of the hidden cylinder and the apparent position of the viewed cylinder differed from one another (Task 6 "dissociated position"). In all conditions in which a cylinder was both viewed and grasped (i.e., the standard grasps and dissociated positions conditions), the size of the hidden cylinder was identical to the one reflected in the mirror. Not surprisingly, DF showed normal grip scaling to target size when the standard grasping task was presented in a block of trials (Task 3). However, when the hidden object was removed entirely for a block of no haptic feedback trials, DF's grip scaling was impaired compared with the controls, and she no longer scaled her grip to target size (Task 4). Curiously, when the standard grasp and no haptic feedback trials were randomly intermixed, DF's grip scaling lay within the control distribution but well towards its lower boundary (Task 5). Finally, when DF was asked to grasp the hidden cylinder when its position differed from the cylinder she viewed in the mirror, she showed no evidence of scaling her grip to the sizes of the cylinders (Task 6). In this final task, the unseen target's position remained constant from trial to trial and was cued with a red LED viewed in the mirror.
To explain DF's results, Schenk (2012a Schenk ( , 2012b argued that DF's spared grip scaling relies on at least two critical sensory cues: 1) egocentric visual cues relating the visible edges of the target to the (felt) position of her hand and 2) haptic feedback about the object. He suggested that these egocentric cues are reliable only when they coincide spatially with the haptic information about her finger contact positions on the goalobject when she grasps them. According to Schenk, requiring DF to grasp an unseen cylinder located away from the apparent position of its size-matched counterpart viewed in the mirror disrupts her grip scaling, because the task deprived DF of the egocentric visual cues to begin with. Schenk concluded that DF's preserved grip scaling to object size is determined by the "offline" integration of multi-modal cues, rather than the nature of the behavioral response (grasp vs. a manual estimation of object size) as Goodale and Milner (1992) originally suggested.
However, Schenk's (2012a Schenk's ( , 2012b reasoning relies on some tacit assumptions that deserve closer scrutiny. First, Schenk assumes that DF's poor grip scaling when the positions of the cylinders are dissociated (Task 6) reflects a deficit in her ability to acquire a particular type of visual information about the object, rather than a deficit in spatially manipulating the information as the task required. To illustrate what we mean by this, consider that Task 6 requires DF to either 1) first process the size of the visible cylinder and then apply this size information to the new location, or 2) first process egocentric relationships between her hand and the edges of the visible cylinder and then adjust the movement vector to the new location of the unseen cylinder. In other words, successful performance on this task requires visual information about the object to be extracted, spatially manipulated, and then used to guide the grasp to a different and visually vacant location. Thus, we cannot be sure whether DF's poor grip scaling on this task was due to a deficit in manipulating object-relevant visual information or a deficit in extracting this information in the first place. Furthermore, Schenk also assumed that the instruction to send the hand to what appears to be an empty location rendered the egocentric cues about the visible object unavailable but preserved the cues to object size. However, it is unclear how Task 6 rendered one type of visual cue (egocentric visual cues vs. visual object size) unavailable while preserving the other. In fact, Schenk makes a similar assumption about the type of visual information DF processed in Task 4 in which haptic feedback was unavailable: once again, he assumes that the visual egocentric cues, rather than visual size, were deprived of haptic calibration and were, therefore, invalidated. However, there is no compelling reason to promote one type of visual information over the other, and even less evidence that DF relies on one visual cue over the other. Nevertheless, Goodale et al. (1994) similarly argued that a change in the task instruction from "grasp the object you see" to "grasp visually empty space but base the grasp on the object you see/saw" alters the neural underpinnings of the response (see also Króliczak et. al. 2007 ). According to their account, however, "real" grasps rely on dorsal-stream vision, while pantomimed grasps rely on a explicit visual percept of the seen or remembered object which is coded in the ventral stream (see also Milner et al. 2012 ). Since DF cannot acquire an explicit visual percept of object size, she cannot apply them to a new visibly vacant position (Goodale et al. 1994 ). Thus, as Milner et al. (2012) have also indicated, her poor performance on this task is actually consistent with the two-visual streams model. Regardless, both Milner et al. (2012) and Schenk's (2012a Schenk's ( , 2012b interpretations of DF's poor grip scaling in this condition rely on a top-down control distinction between real and pantomimed grasps (even those with haptic feedback) that is poorly understood. Furthermore, we cannot know if DF's deficit lies with acquiring requisite visual information about the object or in manipulating and applying it. Given these considerations, we feel compelled to abandon Schenk's dissociated object positions condition (Task 6) as an unambiguous test of the nature of dorsal-stream vision.
So what are we to make of Schenk's (2012a) Task 4, in which haptic feedback about the object was removed? We note that the conditions and instructions of this task were quite different from those that Goodale et al. (1994) employed in the real-time pantomime task, in which DF directed her hand away from a visible object and towards the table surface. If anything, the visual conditions and task instruction (grasp what you see) in Schenk's Task 4 strikes us as optimized for dorsal-stream vision to operate under, yet DF still failed to scale her grip aperture to object size. Milner et al.'s (2012) explanation for this finding is that DF's performance on this task defaulted to a pantomime grasp. However, a common pantomime mode of responding for Tasks 4 and 6 does not explain why the control participants behaved so differently in these conditions. For example, the mean grip scaling slopes for the controls is ϳ50% steeper when haptic feedback about the object is removed (Task 4) than when haptic feedback is present in any of the other grasping tasks (including Task 6), suggesting that some other factor influenced their responses. Both Milner et al. (2012) and Schenk (2012b) have suggested that under normal circumstances, haptic feedback "calibrates" the grasp. Milner et al. maintain that haptic calibration is compatible with the two-visual systems model, because calibration and dorsalstream vision reflect different but equally important aspects of the visuomotor system for accurate reaching and grasping. However, neither Milner et al. nor Schenk elaborated much on how haptic calibration (or the lack thereof) came to affect DF's grip scaling. In general, haptic feedback about object size might influence participants' grasps through mechanisms that use error signals (differences between "expected" and "observed" outcome; see Johansson and Flanagan 2009) to update (or calibrate) future actions. We know, for example, that haptic feedback appears to automatically influence maximum grip aperture (MGA) in neurologically intact individuals: perturbing the normal correspondence between the timing of the expected and/or observed moments of contact between the fingers and the target object alters the MGA of subsequent responses Edin 2004, 2008) . Furthermore, these effects appear to be independent of any awareness of a discrepancy between vision and haptics in terms of the goalobject's size (Safstrom and Edin 2004) . However, Safstrom and Edin's work also indicates that grip scaling to object size is not necessarily affected by visual-haptic mismatches in object size, and so it is difficult to conclusively attribute the controls' steep slopes in Schenk's Task 4 to this low-level mechanism. We suspect that a higher degree of "cognitive supervision" (rather than calibration) resulted in the control participants' unusually steep grip-scaling slopes in Task 4. Specifically, participants may have adopted an explicit strategy by which they categorized their grip aperture response from small to large based on the perceived sizes of the three targets. Since DF cannot perceive the sizes of the three targets, she could not implement this particular strategy. Instead, she adopted a strategy so that she could fail in the safest way possible: DF opened her hand quite widely for all of her grasps in Tasks 4 and 6 (see Fig. 1 ).
Nevertheless, on the basis of a comparison of the gripscaling slopes for Tasks 4 and 5, Schenk argued that DF benefited from the addition of intermittent haptic feedback in Task 5 more so than did the controls. However, this comparison does not actually directly test whether intermittent haptic feedback affected DF's slope. Instead, this test hinges just as much on the controls' slopes as it does on DF's slopes. As such, the fact that the controls' slopes were so much shallower in Task 5 than they were in Task 4 may have driven this test-statistic as much, if not more, than any apparent improvement in DF's slope. In other words, removing the cylinder hidden behind the mirror may have inadvertently altered the strategic requirements of the task. Overall, it would seem that Task 4, like Task 6, may be problematic as a clear test of the functional capacities of the dorsal stream.
In this final section of our paper, we focus on an associative learning account of Schenk's (2012a) findings, one that is consistent with a multi-modal integration view. Milner et al. (2012) put forward a variant of this account as an explanation that, they believed, Schenk might argue for. According to Milner et al.'s association account, DF learned to scale her grip to the sizes of the cylinders through an association between degraded visual signals about the cylinders with more accurate size information obtained from haptics. However, Milner et al. pointed out that this association account could not work because DF did not have any way of perceptually distinguishing one object from another, as Schenk had shown in Task 2. They noted further that both visual and haptic information was presented to DF in Task 6 and yet she still failed to scale her Fig. 1 . DF's maximum grip aperture (MGA, "gripmax") and manual estimates as functions of target object size for all trials of Tasks 2-6 of Schenk's (2012a) experiments. A: grasping a visible goal object that is actually there (standard grasping, Task 3). B: grasping a visible object that was not actually there (Task 4, no haptic feedback trials). C and D: grasping a visible object that was actually there for her to grasp on only half of the trials (no object and object trials of Task 5, respectively). E: directing her hand away from a visible object and grasping an identically sized object that she could not see (Task 6, the object's apparent position is dissociated from its actual position). F: manual estimations of each object's size with the thumb and forefinger (Task 2).
grip to object size. In short, this kind of learned association cannot explain DF's full pattern of results. However, we think it is worthwhile to point out that there is no reason to assume that DF must rely on degraded visual information about the objects. On the contrary, it is possible that DF distinguishes the objects by virtue of any visual feature available to the dorsal stream, independently of conscious awareness. Importantly, this kind of visual-haptic association can explain DF's poor grip scaling when there is no haptic signal about object size (Tasks 2 and 4), and her intermediate performance when the haptic signals are sporadic (Task 5). When the visible object and unseen target positions are dissociated (Task 6), directing one's hand towards what appears to be empty space becomes a pantomime (albeit one with haptic feedback). Interestingly, similar pantomimed grasps invoke activity in quite different brain areas from real grasps in neurologically intact individuals (Króliczak et al. 2007 ). Thus, it is possible that the visual signals DF uses to pantomime grasp, despite haptic feedback about the object, are not available to her because they are processed in regions of her occipital and/or parietal cortices that are damaged. However, we feel that this account is not parsimonious. Specifically, we question the utility of a model that effectively amounts to a "lookup table" mode of adjusting grip aperture, when, as Milner and Goodale (2006) maintain, retinal and extra-retinal sources of information should provide DF's dorsal stream with all of the requisite metrical information about the target to grasp it in the first place.
Moving forward, we suggest several experiments that may help determine whether a low-level haptic calibration, an explicit overarching strategy, or an association account can best describe DF's poor grip scaling without haptic feedback. If "trial to trial" error processing and movement updating mechanisms were at work, then DF's grip scaling in Task 5 (in which haptic and no-haptic feedback trials were randomly intermixed) should be steeper provided haptic feedback was recently and consistently experienced, whereas DF's grip scaling should be shallow provided haptic feedback had not been recently and consistently present. In contrast, cognitive supervision would mask any effects of haptic calibration, leading to the obvious prediction that DF's grip scaling should be consistently shallow across all trials of this intermixed task, independent of when the last instance of haptic feedback occurred. However, a result like this would also be consistent with an association account. Thus, it would be difficult to rule this account out conclusively with Schenk's data set, and, therefore, a new set of experiments is required to test the predictions of this account: DF's normal grip scaling should deteriorate as the number of objects in the stimulus set increases; she should show poor scaling when confronted for the first time with a novel object of a particular size, but she should improve with practice over the course of the experiment. Unfortunately, because DF was allowed many practice trials with the actual experimental stimuli before starting each task (Schenk T, personal communication) , these learning effects would not be evident in the published data and would require further investigation.
In summary, Schenk's (2012a) investigation reinvigorates a fascinating debate over the roles that dorsal stream vision and haptic information play in guiding skilled goal-directed actions. We look forward to future investigations on these topics from Schenk and others, and we hope that this Neuro Forum sparks more interest and further discussion about these core issues.
